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Abstract. This paper makes two contributions. First, we give a semantics for sets of clauses of 
the syntactic form L,,,$= L, & & L,, where each L, is a literal. We call such clauses generally 
Horn clauses. Any such endeavour has to give a coherent, formal treatment of inconsistency (in 
the sense of two-valued logic). Thus, as a second contribution, we give a robust semantics for 
generally Horn programs that allows us to “make sense” of sets of generally Horn clauses that 
are inconsistent (in the two-valued logic sense). This applies to the design of very large knowledge 
bases where inconsistent information is often present. 
1. Motivation 
Over the past few years, several researchers have made attempts to allow program- 
ming with sets of non-Horn clauses [20,22]. However, there has been relative lack 
of success in giving model-theoretic and fixpoint semantics to such extensions. The 
main reason for this lack of success has been due to the fact that sets of non-Horn 
clauses may be inconsistent. Thus, certain programs may mean “nothing” simply 
because they have no models. 
However, if logic programming is to be a pragmatic tool for the development of 
knowledge bases, it must have some means for dealing with inconsistent knowledge. 
Take for example an expert system developed by a team of logic programmers. 
Each programmer might have acquired information from various domain experts. 
It is very common for experts to disagree (often strongly). Thus, the knowledge 
base so developed might contain inconsistent information. 
Pioneering work has been done on reasoning in the presence of inconsistent 
information by da Costa [lo-131 and Belnap [7]. Logics of this kind are often called 
paraconsistent logics. Recently, in an interesting paper, Fitting [14] has given a 
declarative semantics for reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information. 
Under Fitting’s semantics, the sentence A&lA would not be falsified by the 
interpretation that assigns the truth value I to A (where _L is the truth value unknown 
of Kleene [ 17, 191). Thus, A v -iA @ A & 1A is true in any Kleene interpretation 
of the kind discussed by Fitting in which the truth value of A is I, i.e. unknown. 
We feel that the sentence A &lA should be assigned the truth value inconsistent 
(with respect to the intuition of two valued logic) rather than unknown. This 
distinction is made in detail in [7]. 
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Perlis [21, p. 1801 has argued that methods must be found for reasoning in the 
presence of inconsistent information. Paraconsistent [4, lo-131 logics provide what 
seems to be the only way known thus far to declaratively characterize arbitrary sets 
of clauses (that may or may not be inconsistent). The first paraconsistent logic 
programming languages were developed in [I, 9, 23, 241. 
As in [24], we shall use the device of annotated atoms (liter&) instead of using 
the negation symbol. It will be clear from Theorem 3.7 below that there is no loss 
of generality in doing so. In Section 2, we shall introduce the class of generally 
Horn programs and then investigate the semantics of programs in this class in 
Sections 3 and 4. A decidable subset of the class of generally Horn programs is 
introduced in Section 5 and it is shown that this class possesses some interesting 
model theoretic properties. The operational semantics of generally Horn programs 
is discussed in Sections 6 and 7. 
2. Generally Horn logic programs: syntax 
We assume the reader is familiar with the usual syntactic notions of terms, atoms 
and literals. Any undefined expressions used in this paper may be found in Lloyd [ 181. 
The set Y = {I, t, f, T} is the set of truth values of our four-valued logic. The 
truth values I, t, f, T correspond, respectively, to the truth values *‘, T, F, TF of 
Visser [27] and None, T, F, Both of Belnap [7] and stand, respectively, for 
“undefined”, true (in the intuitive sense of two-valued logic), false (also in the 
two-valued sense), and “over-defined” (which may also be thought of as inconsistent 
in the intuition of two-valued logic). We define an ordering < on 9 as follows. 
Definition 2.1. (k/x, y E y), x < y e x = y v x = I v y = T. 
The ordering < is represented by the Hasse diagram given in Fig. 1. We use the 
notation x & y iff y < x where x, y E .Y. Also, as usual, <, > are the irreflexive 
restrictions of 6 and 3, respectively. The set Y is a complete lattice under this 
ordering. 
Definition 2.2. If A is a literal, then A : p is called an annotated literal, where p E 5. 
p is called the annotation of A. If p is one oft, f, then A : p is called a well-annotated 
literal, and p is called a w-annotation. 
T 
t 0 f 
i 
Fig. 1. 
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Intuitively, the annotated atom A : t may be read as a rough approximation to 
“A is known to be true”. Similarly, the annotated atom A: f may be regarded as 
saying “A is known to be false”. This is only meant as a rough aid to intuition, and 
we are not committing ourselves to any epistemic consequences of this point of view. 
Definition 2.3 
(1) Any annotated atom is a formula. (Atoms are the usual atomic formulas of 
first-order logic). 
(2) If A: p is an annotated atom, then 1A: p is a formula. 
(3) If F,, F, are formulas, then F, & F2, F, v F,, F, C= F,, F, a F, are formulas. 
(4) If F is a formula and x any variable symbol, then (Vx)F and (3x)F are 
formulas. 
. . 
Defimtlon 2.4. If A,,, . . . , A, are literals, and if p”,. . . , pn are w-annotations, then 
is called a generalized Horn clause (or gh-clause for short). A, : p,, is called the head 
of the above gh-clause, while A, : p, & . . . & A,, : F,, is called the body of the above 
gh-clause. 
The notion of a substitution is similar to that in [18]. Applying a substitution 0 
to an annotated literal A: p results in the annotated literal A@ : p. The notion of 
applying a substitution is extended in the obvious way to a conjunction of annotated 
literals, and to gh-clauses. 
Definition 2.5. If A : p and B : p are annotated literals, then A : p and B : p are said 
to be unijiuble (with mgu 0) iff A and B are unifiable (with mgu 0). Note that p 
need not equal p as we are not defining the result of the unification yet. 
Definition 2.6. A generalized Horn program (GHP) is a finite set of gh-clauses. 
3. Generally Horn logic programs: semantics 
In this paper, we will consider only “Herbrand-like” interpretations [ 181, i.e. the 
universe of individuals in the interpretation consists of all and only the ground 
terms of the language being interpreted. Unless explicitly specified otherwise, 
throughout the rest of this paper, the set of individuals in models and interpretations 
will be a Herbrand universe. We will consider an interpretation I as a function 
I : BL + 9’ where BL is the Herbrand base under consideration. 
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Definition 3.1. The negadon of an annotation is defined as: l(t) = f, l(f) = t, 
l(I) = I, l(T) = T.’ 
Definition 3.2. A formula is said to be closed if it contains no occurrence of a free 
variable. 
In this paper, we give a non-classical interpretation to the + symbol, i.e. we do 
not treat it as classical material implication. In particular, the equivalence of A v 1B 
and A e B does not hold. This is necessary because, in general, A: t v A: f may 
not be a tautology. This formula asserts (in an intuitionistic fashion) the sentence 
It is known that A is true OR it is known that A is false. 
A formula is closed iff it contains no free occurrences of variables. We use the 
notation (V)F and (3)F to denote the universal closure and existential closure, 
respectively, of the formula F. 
Definition 3.3 (Satisfaction). We write I k F to say that I satisfies E An interpreta- 
tion I 
(1) satisfies the formula F iff I satisfies each of its closed instances, i.e. for each 
variable symbol x occurring free in F, and each variable free term t, F( t/x) 
is satisfied by I (here F( t/x) denotes the replacement of all free occurrences 
of x in F by t), 
(2) satisfies the closed annotated atom A: p iff I(A) 3 p, 
(3) satisfies the closed annotated literal 1A : p iff it satisfies A : lp, 
(4) satisfies the closed formula (3x)F iff for some variable free term t, I k F( t/x), 
(5) satisfies the closed formula (Vx)F iff for every variable free term t, I + F( t/x), 
(6) satisfies the closed formula F, + Fz iff I does not satisfy F2 or I k F,, 
(7) satisfies the closed formula F, &. . . & F, iff I k F, for all i = 1,. . . , n, 
(8) satisfies the closed formula F, v . . . v F, iff I k F, for some 1 s i 5 n, 
(9) satisfies the closed formula Fe G iff I k F + G and I k G e E 
3.4. An I satisfies generalized Horn G if 
satisfies every C E 
The < on truth is extended the obvious way to 
Given a G, and interpretations I,, we say 
< I2 (VA E < Z>(A) 
BG is Herbrand base G. Note the set interpretations (over 
set F truthvalues) is complete lattice the < 
’ Our logic differs from that of Belnap [7] and Visser [27] with respect to our definition of negation. 
Their difinition makes l(Both) = None and l(None) = Both. Our definition seems to be more appropriate 
with regard to the known thaf intuition given to the annotated atoms. 
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Definition 3.5. If C is a gh-clause in G, then the result of replacing all negated 
literals 1A: p in C by A: 1~ is called the positive counterpart Cpoc of C. The GHP 
Gpos obtained by replacing each gh-clause C in the GHP G by Cpos is called the 
positive counterpart of G and is denoted by Gpos. 
Lemma 3.6. I+ (3)lA:p if II= (3)A:lp. Similarly, II= (V)lA:p iff 
I I= (V)A : T/L 
Proof. 
f i= (3)lA:j_~ 
iff I + lA( i/2) : F for some tuple i of variable-free terms 
iff I + A( f/x’) : 1~ for some tuple i of variable-free terms 
iff I + (3)A:lp 
(where i is a tuple of variable free terms and x’ is a tuple of all the variable symbols 
occurring in A). The proof for the universally quantified case is similar. 0 
Theorem 3.7. I is a model of G ifs I is a model of GPO’. 
The above theorem assures us that the device of annotations is powerful enough 
to make the use of negated atoms unnecessary. Therefore, from here on, we will 
always assume that GHPs do not contain any negated literals (with negations being 
implicitly present in the form of atoms annotated with f). 
Example 3.8. Consider the GHP given below: 
p(a):t+, p(a):f*. 
This GHP has exactly one model, viz. the interpretation that assigns the truth value 
T to p(u). This is in keeping with our intuition which says that this program contains 
contradictory information (in the two valued sense). 
Example 3.9. Consider the GHP G given below: 
p(a):t*p(b):f, p(b):t+p(a):f. 
This GHP has several models as follows. 
1, : I,(P(~)) = t; I,(p(b)) = t, I,: Up(a)) = t; bSp(bJ) = .L 
1,: UP(Q)) = t; MP(b)) = f, 1,: h(p(a)) = T; b(p(b)) = T, 
f~: I,(P(~)) = f; I,(p(b)) = t, 1,: Mp(a)) = t; Mp(b)) = T, 
L: UP(~)) = 1; Ldp(b)) = 1, 19: b,(p(a)) = T; b(p(b)) = t. 
1,: f,(p(a)) = 1; I,(p(b)) = t, 
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The proliferation of models may appear somewhat bewildering, but it is important 
to observe that the GHP G has a least mode1 (viz. 14) and a greatest mode1 (viz. 
1,). The least mode1 says that from G, it is not known that p(a) is true and it is not 
known that p(b) is true. Similarly, the model, I3 says that if it is known that p(a) 
is false then it is known that p(b) is true. 
Having defined the models of GHP, we now proceed to define a certain monotone 
operator from interpretations to interpretations. We then relate the prefixpoints’ of 
this operator with the models of Generalized Horn Programs. 
4. (Pre-)fixpoint semantics 
It has now become a standard practice in logic programming research to try and 
naturally characterize the models of a program in terms of the (possibly pre- or 
post-)2 fixpoints of a certain monotone operator usually denoted by Tp. If S is a 
subset of a complete lattice L, then u S and n S denote, respectively, the least 
upper bound of S and the greatest lower bound of S. 
Definition 4.1. Suppose G is a GHP. Then TG is a mapping from the Herbrand 
interpretations of G to the Herbrand interpretations of G defined by 
T,(I)(A) = lub{p IA: p + B, : p, &. * * & Bk : p.k is a ground instance of 
a gh-clause in G and I l= B, : p, & . . . & Bk : puk}. 
Example 4.2. Consider the GHP G given below: 
p(a):t*, p(a):fep(u):t 
and the interpretation I that assigns t to p(u). Then T,(I)( p(u)) = lub{t, f} = T. 
Theorem 4.3. TG is monotonic. 
Proof. Suppose I, < I2 where I,, I2 are interpretations. Then if I, k B: p then 
I, b B : p for all B E BG. Thus, 
T,(I,)(A) 
= lub{p 1 A : p =+ B, : p, & . ’ . & Bk : puk is a ground instance of a gh- 
clauseinGandI,kB,:~,&~+~&Bk:~k} 
~lub{E.LIA:~uBB,:~L,&...&B,:~.k is a ground instance of a gh- 
clause in G and I2 k B,: p, & + . . & Bk: pLk}. 0 
’ x is a pre- (resp. post-)fixpoint of a function f: L + L where L is a lattice under the F; ordering iff 
f(x) C x (resp. x cf(x)). 
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Before proceeding to investigate the fixpoints of TG, we show that the pre-fixpoints 
of TG are exactly the models of G. 
Theorem 4.4. I is a model of the GHP G ifl T,(Z) 6 1. 
Proof. 
T,(Z)(A) < Z(A) 
iff (directly from the definition of TG), u {p 1 A : p G= Body is a ground 
instance of a gh-clause in G and Z k Body} < Z(A) 
iff for every ground instance of the form A: p G= Body of a gh-clause 
in G, Z k Body implies Z(A) > t_~ 
iff Z k A : p e Body for all ground instances of the form A : p -k Bod_y 
of gh-clauses in G 
iffZ+G. 0 
Theorem 4.4 assures us that the models of G are exactly the pre-fixpoints of TG. 
The monotonicity of TG assures us that TG has a fixpoint, and hence a pre-fixpoint, 
and hence a model. In addition, as TG is monotone, and as the set of interpretations 
(over 5) is a complete lattice, the least fixpoint and the least pre-fixpoint of TG 
must coincide, thus giving us the proof of the following result. 
Theorem 4.5. Any GHP G has a least model J&. In addition, this least model is 
identical to the leastjxpoint lfp( TG) of TG. 
Unfortunately, monotonicity by itself does not guarantee us that the least fixpoint 
of TG is semi-computable (i.e. recursively enumerable). We show, nevertheless, that 
this is indeed the case. 
Definition 4.6. We define the special interpretation A to be the interpretation that 
assigns the value I to all members of BG. Similarly, the interpretation V assigns 
the value T to all members of BG. 
Definition 4.7. The upward iteration of T, is defined as follows: 
TGTQ = A, T,?a = Tci(T~?(a - I)), T,?A =U{T&+<Al 
where CY is a successor ordinal and A is a limit ordinal. The downward iteration of 
TG is defined as: 
T&O = V, T&a) = TG(TGJ(~ - I)), T& = fl {T&r] 1 r1-c Al 
where cx is a successor ordinal and A a limit ordinal (n denotes glb). 
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Remark4.8. We observe that TGTO < T,Tl < . . . < TG’fw and that TGJ,O 2 T,&l + 
. . . z= T&J. 
Theorem 4.9. TGTw = JR~. 
Proof (A& 6 T,Tw). In order to prove this, it is sufficient to show that TGTo is a 
model of G. Suppose 
A : p C= B, : +, & . . . & Bk : I& 
is a ground instance C6’ of some gh-clause C E G, and suppose 
T,?oJ + B, : I+?, & . . . & Bk : $k. 
Then, it must be true that for some finite n, 
T,Tn != B, : t,h, &. . ’ & Bk : qhk. 
But then, T,T(n + 1) = T,(T,Tn) I= A:p (by definition of TG), hence it follows 
that TGtu F A:p (by Remark 4.8). Thus, TGTw is a model of G, and is therefore 
a pre-fixpoint of TG. 
( TG?W < AZ,). Since TG is monotonic, for all (Y, TGTa < J& where JI& is the 
least prefixed-point of TG. Hence, T,?oJ is the least prefixed-point of T,. q 
A subset D of a complete lattice (L, C) is directed iff for every pair of elements 
a, b in P, there is an element c E D such that a & c and b E c. 
Definition 4.10. Let u S be the least upper bound (in L) of the subset S of L. An 
operator T: L + L is weakly continuous iff 
T(UD)cUU-(d)ld E 01. 
T is continuous ifi 
T(U D) = u {T(d) 1 d E 01. 
Lemma 4.11. T: L + L is continuous @ T is monotonic and weakly continuous. 
Theorem 4.12. TG is continuous. 
Proof. Since TG is monotone, it suffices to prove that TG is weakly continuous. 
Recall that the set of interpretations of GHP G is the set of mappings (of type) 
B, + Y and this set is a complete lattice where I, < 1, iff I,(A) =S I,(A) for all 
A E B,. Let D be a non-empty directed subset of B, + 9, and let J = U D. We 
must show that T,(J) =S U {T,(I)1 I E D}. For this, it suffices to show that for all 
A E BL, there is an I E D such that T,(J)(A) = T,(I)(A), but this follows at once 
since T,(J)(A) E .Y and .Y is finite. 0 
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The definite part of an interpretation I is the set {A : p ) I(A) = p and p # I}. 
The continuity of TG together with standard techniques of recursion theory yields 
that the definite part of each TGtn, and hence the definite part of TGtm is recursively 
enumerable. Hence, the definite part of the least mode1 of G is recursively enumer- 
able. This assures us that if lfp( TG) ‘F A: + (A E BG and /1 # I), then it is indeed 
possible to show that lfp( TG) I= A: p. We will discuss SLD-resolution-like proof 
procedures for GHPs in Sections 6 and 7. 
5. Well-behaved GHPs 
Theorem 4.9 is likely to immediately raise the question: “Is TGlw identical to 
the greatest model?’ Unfortunately, as in the case of logic programs (cf. [ 18, p. 
31]), the answer to this question is negative. However, the reason for this is that 
TGJO is the greatest model of G. Indeed, each T,&cy is a mode1 of G, since it is a 
prefixed-point of TG_ Thus, we are led to ask the following. 
Question 5.1. What kind of models would we like GHPs to have, and in addition, 
what kind of GHPs should be qualified as being acceptable or decent? 
One answer is immediately forthcoming. We should like an acceptable GHP to 
be one that expresses consistent knowledge. Before proceeding to finish our answer 
to the above question, it is necessary to introduce a new definition. 
Definition 5.2. An interpretation I of a GHP G is said to be nice if the following 
condition holds: 
(VA E B,)I(A) # T. 
We are therefore interested in those models of G that are nice. Now it should be 
apparent that in view of the fact that T is a formalization of the notion of both true 
andfulse which is exactly the notion of inconsistency, we should like to characterize 
the acceptable GHPs to be exactly those GHPs that possess a nice model. Thus, we 
have now answered the preceding question in full: 
(1) The models of a GHP that interest us are the nice models. 
(2) The GHPs that we shall be interested in are the acceptable ones. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to identify a class % of GHPs that are guaranteed to 
possess nice models. In addition, it is desirable that YZ be decidable. 
Definition 5.3. A GHP G is well-behaved iff the gh-clauses of G satisfy the following 
condition: 
If G,, Gz are gh-clauses in G such that their (respective) heads are 
A,:I~.,,A,:~, and if A,, A, are unifiable, then p, = pLz. 
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It remains to prove our claim that every well-behaved GHP has a nice model. 
We go one step further and show that for well-behaved GHPs, TGtm is nice. We 
already know that TGTw is a model of G; so this is sufficient to substantiate our claim. 
Lemma 5.4. G has a nice model ifs TGTw is nice. 
Theorem 5.5. If G is a well-behaved GHP, then TGTw is nice. 
Proof. Suppose G is well-behaved and TGTw is not nice. Then there is some A E BG 
such that T,Tw(A) = T. But then, there exists some finite n such that TQtn(A) = T 
(n > 0). But then there must exist two gh-clauses C, , C2 in G of the form 
A,:t~B,:*,&...&B,:*,, 
A,:ftiD,:p,&...&D,:p, 
such that A is an instance of A,, A, and T,T(n - 1) + B, : +, 8~. . . & B, : &, and 
T,T(n - 1) + D, :p, & . . . & Dk : pk. As A is a common instance of A,, AZ, it is true 
that A,, A, are unifiable, thus contradicting the assumption that G is well behaved. 
Therefore, TGTw must be nice. 0 
Theorem 5.6. In general, the set NICE(G) = {G ) G is a GHP having at least one 
nice model} is undecidable (and indeed is rI:-complete). 
Proof. Given recursively enumerable set W, we can find an ordinary definite clause 
program P such that TpTw is recursively isomorphic to W (cf. [2]). Obtain GHP 
G from P by annotating all the atoms in P with t, and by adding the unit gh-clause 
p(a) : f C=. Then TGTw is a nice model of G iff p(a) cz TpTw. It follows, by standard 
techniques of recursion theory, that the problem of whether TGTw is a nice model 
of G, and hence by Lemma 5.4, the problem of whether G has a nice model is 
II:-complete. 0 
This is not a problem to worry about too much. We observe, for example, that 
deciding whether a classical logic program [18] is canonical [16] is II:-complete. 
Thus, we are forced to try to define recursive subsets of NICE(G). Theorem 5.6, 
together with the fact that T,Tw is recursively enumerable, entails that the set 
NICE(G) is II:-complete. 
Theorem 5.7. If G is a well-behaved GHP, then T,j,l is nice; hence, T,j,a is nice 
for all ff > 0. 
Proof. Suppose G is well-behaved and T,j,l is not nice. Then there is some A E BG 
such that T,Jl(A) = T. Then there must be at least two gh-clauses C,, 12, in G 
having ground instances of the following form: 
A:t+D,:p,&...&BI,:p,, 
A:f%E,:$,&...&E,:$, 
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such that TGJ,O satisfies the bodies of both the above instances of C, and Cz. But 
then the heads of C,, C2 are unifiable, but the annotations of the heads are distinct, 
thus contradicting the well-behavedness of G. Therefore, T,ll is nice. 0 
Example 5.8. Consider the well-behaved GHP G given below: 
p(a):t-eq(X):t, q(s(X)):teq(X):t. 
In this case, TGtw = A, while 
T&J(p(a)) = t. 
For every ground atom A E B,, A # p(a), T&w(A) = 1. However, T,Jw(p( a)) = 
t. TG&w is not a fixed-point of TG as TGJ(w + l)(p(a)) = 1. 
The above example illustrates the fact that while T,Tw is a fixpoint of TG, TGJw 
may not be a fixpoint of T,; (of course, it is constrained to be a pre-fixpoint). We 
borrow the notion of a supported model from Apt et al. (cf. [3]). 
Definition 5.9. A model I of a GHP G is said to be supported if for every ground 
atom A E BG such that Z(A) f I, there is a gh-clause in G having a ground instance 
of the form 
such that Z k B, : $, 8~. . . & B,,, : +, and Z(A) = p. 
Note that all literals occurring in a GHP are well annotated. Hence, Z_L f T. Thus, 
every supported model must be nice. 
We now investigate the relationship between the fixpoints of T, and the supported 
models of G. 
Lemma 5.10. Zf Z is a supported (and hence, nice) model of the GHP G, then Z is a 
jixpoint of TG. 
Proof. Suppose I is a supported model of G and Z(A) = p and Z.L g {I, T). Let 
Z = {A : p 1 there is a ground instance C of a gh-clause in G such that C is A : p + F 
and Z k F}. A: ,U E r since Z is a supported model of G. Since I k G, Z_L = Z(A) + 
U{plA:p E r} = T,(Z)(A). But T,(Z)(A) 3 p sincep E {plA:p E f}.Therefore, 
/_L = Z(A) = T,(Z)(A). U 
Lemma 5.11. Zf I is a nicefixpoint of TG, then Z is a supported model of G. 
Proof. Assume Z(A) # _L. As Z is nice, Z(A) must be in {t, f}. 
Case 1: [Z(A) = t] Therefore, since Z is a fixed point of TG, T,(Z)(A) = t. That 
is, by definition, U{P~A:P+B,:$,&... & Bk: cj~~ is a ground distance of a 
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gh-clause in G and Z k B, : $,, & . . . & Bk : I,!J~} = t. But for the lub above to be t, 
there must be a gh-clause in G having a ground instance of the A: t G= 
B, : $, & . . * & Bk : $k and such that Z k B, : I,!I, & + . . & Bk : (Lk, i.e. Z is supported. 
Case 2: [Z(A) = f] Similar to Case 1. 0 
Theorem 5.12. Z is a supported model of the GHP G ifsZ is a nice$xpoint of G. 
Jaffar et al. (cf. [15]) have introduced a decency thesis in conventional logic 
programming. Essentially, the decency thesis claims that all decent logic programs 
are canonical [16], i.e. Tplw = gfp( Tp) where TP is defined as in [18]. The term 
decent as used by Jaffar et al. is intended to refer to programs that arise “naturally” 
in good programming practice. Under this criterion, the logic program obtained by 
deleting the annotations in Example 5.9 is not decent. We now give the definition 
of a canonical GHP. 
Definition 5.13. A GHP G is canonical itI Tc&w is a fixpoint of TG. 
It follows immediately from Lemma 5.11 that if G is a well-behaved canonical 
program, then TG&w is a supported model of G. 
Theorem 5.14. TGJ,w is the greatest (nice) supported model of G if G is a canonical 
well-behaved GHP. 
Proof. Since G is canonical, TGJw is a fixpoint of TG, which must be the greatest 
fixpoint of TG as TG is monotonic. Since G is well-behaved, TG&w is nice. Thus, 
TGJ,w is the greatest supported model of G. 0 
With this, we conclude our declarative characterization of GHPs. The fact that 
TGJ,w is a supported nice model of G (G a canonical well-behaved GHP) is useful 
in characterizing the use of GHPs in reasoning about beliefs [9]. A more comprehen- 
sive discussion of decent GHPs is included in [9]. In addition, we have proved that 
the least model of a GHP is recursively enumerable and that when G is well behaved, 
the least model of G coincides with the least nice model of G (Theorem 5.5). We 
now investigate the operational semantics of GHPs which bears some similarity to 
the approach of Van Emden [25] for a quantitative deduction. 
6. Operational semantics for GHPs 
Definition 6.1. Suppose G is a GHP, A is a (not necessarily ground) atom in the 
language of G, and Z..L an annotation. We define an and/or tree T( G, A: /.L) as follows: 
(1) The root of T( G, A : TV) is an or-node labelled A : /-L. 
(2) If N is an or-node, then it is labelled by a single annotated literal. 
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(3) Each and-node is labelled by a gh-clause from G and a substitution. 
(4) Descendants of an or-node are and-nodes and descendants of and-nodes are 
or-nodes. 
(5) If N is an or-node labelled by B: (Y (a # i), and if CO is an instance of a 
gh-clause C in G of the following form: 
where /3 S= a, then there is a descendant of N labelled by C and 0. An or-node 
with no descendants is called an uninformative node. 
(6) If N is an and-node labelled by the gh-clause C and the substitution 8, then 
for every annotated literal B: y in the body of C, there is a descendant or-node 
labelled Be: y. An and-node with no descendants is called a success node. 
Associated with every node N in the and/or tree T( G, A, p) is a truth value v(N) 
called the value of that node. v is defined as follows: 
If N is a success node labelled B : $, then u(N) = $. 
If N is an uninformative node, then v(N) = 1. 
If N is an or-node that is not uninformative and its descendants are N,, . . . , Nk, 
then v(N) = lub{v(N,), . . . , u(N,)}. 
If N is a non-terminal and-node labelled with the gh-clause A :p C= 
B, : q?, & . . . & BI, : Gk, and if the value V( N,) of each of its descendant nodes N, 
labelled Bi is such that v(N,) > $, for all 1 s i s k, then v(N) = p, else v(N) = 1. 
Before proceeding to investigate the soundness and completeness of the and/or 
tree search procedure just described, we give an example. 
Val: t 
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Example 6.2. Consider the GHP G given below: 
p(a):t% p(X):teq(X):f& r(X):t, 
r(a):t*, r(b):t*, 
q(a):f+, q(b):fe=. 
Consider the problem of checking whether p( b) : t is satisfied by TGTw. The and/or 
tree associated with this problem is shown in Fig. 2. We see that the truth value of 
p(b) in TGTw is t. 
Definition 6.3, A GHP G is said to be covered if every variable symbol that occurs 
in the body of a gh-clause C E G occurs in the head of C. 
Theorem 6.4. If G is a covered GHP, A E B, and if T( G, A: p) is finite with root 
R, then v(R) < T,Tw(A). 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1’ of Van Emden [25]. Observe that the 
proof in [25] applies only to covered rule sets. 0 
The reason for introducing covered GHPs is due to the following GHP Q and 
and/or tree. 
Example 6.5 
p:t*q(X):t&r(X):t, r(a):t*, q(b):t% 
Corresponding to this program Q and query p : t, we have the AND/OR tree shown 
in Fig. 3. However, ToTw(p) = 1, though the truth value associated with the root 
I 
p:t <=q(X):t& 
r(X) : t 
Sub& ( ) 
q(X) : t r(X) : t 
Paraconsisfent logic programming 149 
of this tree is t. For covered programs, the atoms occurring in OR-nodes of and/or 
trees are ground. This restriction to analogously defined covered rule sets is also 
necessary for the theorems of [25]. 
Theorem 6.6. If G is a GH P, A E B,, and if .Y( G, A : p) is jinite with root R, then 
v(R) z= T,Tw(A). 
Proof. Let R be the root of Y( G, A : p,). It suffices to prove by induction that 
(Vn E N)v(R) z= TQtn(A) 
(where N denotes the set of non-negative integers). 
Base case (n = 0): Trivially true as T,TO(A) = 1. 
Inductive case: Let cr = T,T(n + l)(A). 
Case 1 (a = T): Then there are two ground instances C, 0,) Cl& of gh-clauses 
C,, C2 E G of the form 
A:t+B,:$,&...&B,:+,, 
A:feD,:p,&...&D,:p, 
and Tern satisfies the bodies of C,0, and C2&, respectively. Each B, and 0, is 
ground, and therefore, by the induction hypothesis, V( Bi) + +; and V( 0:) 3 pi where 
B: and 0: are the atoms in the roots of the and/or trees Y(G, B,: ~5,) and 
Y( G, D, : pi), respectively. Therefore, the descendant nodes NC,, NC2 of R that are 
labelled with C, , C,, respectively, are such that V( IV<.,) > t, V( IV,,) 3 f, respectively, 
whence, V(R) Z= lub{t, f} = T. This completes ths case. 
Case 2 (cr = I): Trivial. 
Case 3 (a = t or f): In this case, the analysis is almost identical to that of the 
case when cy = T except that we consider only one gh-clause C, instead of two. 0 
Corollary 6.7 (Soundness). If R is a covered GHP, A E BG and Y(G, A : p) is.finite, 
then v(R) = T,Tw(A) where R is the root of F(G, A: p). 
As in the case of [25], the restriction to finite and/or trees seems to be necessary. 
The following question then arises: 
Question 6.8. Can an SLD-resolution like proof procedure be given for GHPs? 
The answer to this question seems to be “NO”. This is because a certain amount 
of breadth-oriented search seems necessary in order to compute T,Tw(A) for 
A E Bc. However, in the case of well-behaved GHPs, it does seem to be possible 
to define an SLD-resolution like proof procedure. 
7. SLDnh-resolution for well-behaved GHPs 
Recall that a literal is well annotated if the annotation is either t or f. A query is 
the existential closure of a conjunction of w-annotated literals. From here on, when 
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discussing queries, we will often write them as a conjunction of w-annotated literals 
and assume all variables in it to be implicitly existentially quantified. 
Definition 7.1. An nh-resolvent with respect to A, :pi of the query Q given by 
A &... IIPI &Ak:pkandthegh-clauseCoftheformD:P~B,:~,&...&B,:*I, 
is the query 
(A, : ~18~ . . . & A,_, : pi_, & B, : $, & . . . & B,: & & A,+, : pi+, & . . . & Ak : pk)O 
where p + p, and f3 is the most general unifier of D and A;. (Without loss of 
generality, we assume that C and Q contain no variable symbols in common, i.e. 
we assume that they have been standardized apart, cf. Lloyd [18].) Ai : pi and D: p 
are called “the literals nh-resolved upon” (“nh” stands for “non-Horn”). Note that 
an nh-resolvent is always a query. 
Definition 7.2. An S!,Dnh-deduction from the initial query Q. and the GHP G is a 
sequence 
(Qo, CL, ‘A), . . . 9 (Qi, Ci+, 3 et+,), . . . 
where Qr+, is the nh-resolvent of Qr and C,,, and C,,, is a renamed version of 
some gh-clause in G such that C,,, has no variable symbols in common with any 
of Qo, . . . , Qr, G, . . . , C, and or+, is the most general unifier of the literals 
nh-resolved upon. 
Definition 7.3. An SLDnh-refutation of the initial query QO is a finite SLDnh- 
deduction 
(Qo, C,, W, . . . , (On, Cn+, , en+,) 
such that the result of resolving Q,, and Q,,+r is the empty gh-clause. Associated 
with every SLDnh-refutation is a path called the SLDnh-refutation path. Figure 4 
gives the SLDnh-refutation path associated with the above SLDnh-refutation. 
0 
Fig. 4. 
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We now address the soundness of SLDnh-resolution. 
Theorem 7.4 (Soundness). Zf there exists an SLDnh-refutation of the initial query Q. 
A,:p,&...&A,,:p, 
from the GHP G, then 
TG?W + 3CQd. 
Proof. Suppose there exists an SLDnh-refutation of the initial query Q. from G of 
the following form: 
(Qo, C,, ‘A>, . . . , (On, Cm+, , on+,>. 
We will show by induction on n that Totw k 3(Q,). 
Base case (n = 0): Then the nh-resolvent of Q. and C, is the empty query, i.e. 
Q,, is a unit conjunction (i.e. A, :p,) and C, is a unit gh-clause, i.e. C, is of the 
form A’: j3 G= where p > p, and A, 0, = A’B,. As TGTw is a model of the GHP G, 
it must be a model of C, , and so it must be true that for every ground instance A, 
of A’, T,Tw(A,) + p. In particular, for every A, that is a ground instance of A’B,, 
T,;Tw(A,) z= p + p,, whence T,Tw k 3Q,. 
Induction case: Suppose 
(00, C,, e,), . . , (On, C,+I, on+l), (Qn+, , G+z, R,+,> 
is an SLDnh-refutation of QO. Then 
(91, Cz, b), . . , (Qn, C+, , &+d 
is an SLDnh-refutation of Q,. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, T,Twk3( Q,). 
But Q, is the nh-resolvent of Q. and C,. So Q, is of the form 
(A,:p,&...&Ai~,:pI~,&E,:cCI,&...&E,:~,&A,+,:p,+,&...&A,,,:p,,)8, 
where C, is the gh-clause 
H : 6 + E, : 4, & . . . & E,: I)? 
such that HO, = A,@, and 6 + pI (by definition of nh-resolution). As T,Tw k (3)Q, 
it follows that 
(as this is a sub-conjunct of Q,). As Tc2Tw is a model of G (Theorem 4.9), it must 
satisfy every gh-clause of G (and every renamed version of any gh-clause in G). 
In particular, TGTw must satisfy C,0,. As TGtw satisfies the body of C,0,, it 
must satisfy HO,: 6. But HO, = A#,; so TGTo k A$, : 6. Therefore, as 6 + pI, 
TGTw k A;O, : p,. Thus, 
TGTw b (3)(A,:p, &. . .&A,:p,)O,. q 
Notice that the soundness theorem above does not restrict the GHP to covered 
GHPs. However, this restriction is needed for our completeness result. 
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Theorem 7.5 (Completeness). Suppose G is a covered, well-behaved GHP. Then if 
Qo=A,:p,&...&A,,: pm is a ground query that is satisjied by T,Tw, then there is 
an SLDnh-refutation of Q0 from G. 
Proof. Suppose G is covered and well behaved. Let Q. = (A,: p, &. ’ . & A,,, : p,) 
be a ground query that is satisfied by T G w. Then there must be some n > 0 (as t 
pI # I for all i) such that T,Tn I= Qo. We will prove by induction on n that an 
SLDnh-refutation of Q. from G exists. 
Base case: Suppose T,Tl k QO. Then for each 1 4 i < m, there is a gh-clause C, 
in G having a ground instance C,0, of the form A: pi += where pi & p,. As Q,, is 
ground, none of the substitutions Bi affect it, and so 
(A, : PI& . . . & An : pm, C,, e,>, 
(A,:P,&...&A,:P,,C,,~*) 
is an SLDnh-refutation of QO. 
Inductive case: Suppose TGT(r + 1) k A, : p, & . . & A,,, : pm. Then, for each Ai, 
there is a gh-clause Ci in G having a ground instance C,O, of the form 
Ai:p,+B’,&.4B:, 
where PI > pI, and TGTr k Bi &. . . & B:>. Now, as each A, is ground, and as G is 
covered, B\ & . . . & BL, is ground and so, by the induction hypothesis, there exists 
an SLDnh-refutation Ri of Bi & . . . & B:, . Therefore, 
(A; : Pi, C,, ei), Ri 
is a SLDnh-refutation of Ai. Denote the SLDnh-refutation tree of each A,:p, by 
ri. Then Fig. 5 gives an SLDnh-refutation tree for Qo. 0 
Al:cxl &...&A,: a, 







Example 7.6. Consider the following covered, well-behaved GHP: 
p(X):te9(X):f&r(X):t, 
9(a):t+, 9(b):f% 9(c):f+, 
r(a):te, r(a):f+, r(b):fe=, r(c):t*, 
and the queries p(b): t and p(c): t. The latter succeeds, but the former does not. 
This is despite the fact that the above GHP expresses inconsistency via the fifth and 
sixth clauses. This is a GHP that expresses inconsistency via the annotations, but 
is not inconsistent in the classical sense (i.e. it has models, and does not entail 
everything). 
8. Summary and future work 
We have developed a fixpoint semantics for arbitrary sets of clauses. Based upon 
the intuitive connection between arbitrary sets of clauses and positive GHPs, we 
have given a means of associating a fixed point semantics with sets of arbitrary 
clauses. It is clear that a GHP that expresses inconsistency via the annotations need 
not be classically inconsistent (in terms of having no models). Example 7.6 amply 
demonstrates this fact. Thus, GHPs provide a theoretical framework for mechanical 
reasoning in systems that are inconsistent. 
Some open problems remaining are: 
Problem 1. Can we find a recursive class of GHPs that (strictly) includes the class 
of well-behaved GHPs, while still guaranteeing existence of a nice model? 
Problem 2. How much can the covering condition used in the completeness result 
of SLDnh-resolution be weakened? In view of the very strong conditions imposed 
on completeness results for SLDNF-resolution for general logic programs [5,6] it 
should not be surprising that we have such a restriction in Theorem 7.5. 
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